mobileCategory: stupidity
01/12/07 09:20 - ID#37658
dammit dammit dammit
Oh well, I wrote probably a 10-paragraph post in response to (e:Libertad) 's Hail Mary post but then I managed to lose it all like a stupid fucking idiot.
Dammit dammit dammit!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Sigh. OK, here's the short version of what I painstakingly wrote and then accidentally 86'd. Arrgh.
When the SecDef remarks that he's no military expert we could choose to be horrified. After all he's the Secretary of Defense! Shouldn't he be an expert on military matters?
Well, maybe not necessarily. The SecDef is the civilian head of the Pentagon, and he's responsible for running that entire bureaucracy. Part of his job is to provide civilian oversight of the military so it doesn't get out of control -- both in terms of developing its own agenda (and thus posing a potentional challenge or even threat to our elected officials) and in terms of ensuring that the military is not wasting taxpayers' money on unnecessary projects.
One of the things that Donald Rumsfeld was trying to do at the Pentagon was to force the US military to undergo a "defense transformation" -- namely, to make the US military faster, lighter, and more technologically sophisticated. Not a bad idea.
The bad idea was to try to make the invasion of Iraq a laboratory for a newly transformed military, for two reasons. First, because this defense transformation was still ongoing, and therefore not necessarily ready for a test; and second, because the SecDef is not necessarily the person you want to plan a military operation. We have generals who have studied for decades and who have trained for just this purpose.
In this case, Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, went against the generals' normal assumptions that an invasion of this kind requires more troops than seem necessary because of contingencies and post-conflict stablization operations.
So the SecDef's office was fighting two wars with the old, established military brass: one war to transfom the military as an institution, and one to shape the war strategy for Iraq.
That first war (transformation) was probably justified -- incorporating new technologies, reducing personnel demands, keeping an eye on unnecessary spending on outdated weapons platforms, all good. But fighting a war within the Pentagon to impose civilians' views on warfighting on the generals who were planning the invasion of Iraq (notably Gen Tommy Franks) -- maybe this wasn't such a good idea.
Sure, the initial invasion was pretty impressive -- the US military was able to successfully invade and enter Baghdad on the cheap. But as we've seen, it was a shortsighted strategy that failed to account for how to stabilize Baghdad and much of the rest of Iraq. After all, smart bombs are smart enough to strike the correct targets (most of the time) but they are not smart enough to talk with civilians, to negotiate truces, to do police work, and to build trust in new governing officials.
We could try to blame the flawed strategy on the generals -- but a lot of generals were uncomfortable with the 'lean' approach that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz favored. Unfortunately, those who spoke out were marginalized.
Anyway, there's a good case to be made that the civilians in the SecDef's office should not have tried to shape and micromanage the military strategy for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. By doing so they exhibited great hubris.
Seems to me that the new SecDef doesn't want to fall into this trap, and that he is trying to send a strong signal that he will leave the military planning to those who are experienced in it and who have trained for it. Let the Chiefs of Staff and let General Petraeus (who just spent months working with a team to write a new counterinsurgency manual for the US military) do what they need to do to implement the directives from our political leaders.
After all, the new SecDef is not a military expert -- Gates is an expert on intelligence and on running big bureaucracies. So he should focus on that, and let the generals do their jobs.
So should we be horrified that the SecDef publicly admits that he's not an expert in military matters? In a world where former SecDef Rumsfeld and his staff ran amok, I say I'm more relieved than horrified.
But that's just my take on it...
Dammit dammit dammit!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Sigh. OK, here's the short version of what I painstakingly wrote and then accidentally 86'd. Arrgh.
When the SecDef remarks that he's no military expert we could choose to be horrified. After all he's the Secretary of Defense! Shouldn't he be an expert on military matters?
Well, maybe not necessarily. The SecDef is the civilian head of the Pentagon, and he's responsible for running that entire bureaucracy. Part of his job is to provide civilian oversight of the military so it doesn't get out of control -- both in terms of developing its own agenda (and thus posing a potentional challenge or even threat to our elected officials) and in terms of ensuring that the military is not wasting taxpayers' money on unnecessary projects.
One of the things that Donald Rumsfeld was trying to do at the Pentagon was to force the US military to undergo a "defense transformation" -- namely, to make the US military faster, lighter, and more technologically sophisticated. Not a bad idea.
The bad idea was to try to make the invasion of Iraq a laboratory for a newly transformed military, for two reasons. First, because this defense transformation was still ongoing, and therefore not necessarily ready for a test; and second, because the SecDef is not necessarily the person you want to plan a military operation. We have generals who have studied for decades and who have trained for just this purpose.
In this case, Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, went against the generals' normal assumptions that an invasion of this kind requires more troops than seem necessary because of contingencies and post-conflict stablization operations.
So the SecDef's office was fighting two wars with the old, established military brass: one war to transfom the military as an institution, and one to shape the war strategy for Iraq.
That first war (transformation) was probably justified -- incorporating new technologies, reducing personnel demands, keeping an eye on unnecessary spending on outdated weapons platforms, all good. But fighting a war within the Pentagon to impose civilians' views on warfighting on the generals who were planning the invasion of Iraq (notably Gen Tommy Franks) -- maybe this wasn't such a good idea.
Sure, the initial invasion was pretty impressive -- the US military was able to successfully invade and enter Baghdad on the cheap. But as we've seen, it was a shortsighted strategy that failed to account for how to stabilize Baghdad and much of the rest of Iraq. After all, smart bombs are smart enough to strike the correct targets (most of the time) but they are not smart enough to talk with civilians, to negotiate truces, to do police work, and to build trust in new governing officials.
We could try to blame the flawed strategy on the generals -- but a lot of generals were uncomfortable with the 'lean' approach that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz favored. Unfortunately, those who spoke out were marginalized.
Anyway, there's a good case to be made that the civilians in the SecDef's office should not have tried to shape and micromanage the military strategy for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. By doing so they exhibited great hubris.
Seems to me that the new SecDef doesn't want to fall into this trap, and that he is trying to send a strong signal that he will leave the military planning to those who are experienced in it and who have trained for it. Let the Chiefs of Staff and let General Petraeus (who just spent months working with a team to write a new counterinsurgency manual for the US military) do what they need to do to implement the directives from our political leaders.
After all, the new SecDef is not a military expert -- Gates is an expert on intelligence and on running big bureaucracies. So he should focus on that, and let the generals do their jobs.
So should we be horrified that the SecDef publicly admits that he's not an expert in military matters? In a world where former SecDef Rumsfeld and his staff ran amok, I say I'm more relieved than horrified.
But that's just my take on it...
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Eventually this (Iraq) requires a political solution; something that requires patience and negotiation. The Neocons want instant fixes. They are waaay in over their heads. They are like a bunch of kids (with oversized heads, no doubt) who think the whole world is a gigantic game of Risk....
I don't disagree with anything here, but I would also like to add that with respect to the 'lean' approach that the Pentagon pursued with the war (which I think ultimately was the right strategy to topple Hussein but the wrong strategy to secure the country) - General Tommy Franks was one of the men who developed this lean strategy prior to us going into Iraq. I read his book and it was a fascinating look into the inner workings of war planning and the interaction between the executive branch, the SecDef and the leading generals.
SecDefs traditionally are civilian bureaucrats and this is a position that essentially requires somebody to be CEO level - I personally believe that any meddling that Rummy may or may not have done was directed by the wants and needs of the executive branch. Not that I think he disagreed anyway.
Re Hubris: I'm reading the book by the same name :::link::: and it's pretty good. Isikoff and Corn do a nice job of weaving together a number of complicated threads of the Iraq war story, and they seem to have a little bit less of an axe to grind than, say, Frank Rich (though I plan to read his book, too :::link::: ).
Finally, one more thing on SecDef Gates -- a slick remark before the Sneate panel this morning designed to make critics of the "surge" seem like hypocrites: "The impetus to add U.S. forces came initially from our commanders there. It would be a sublime, yet historic, irony if those who believe the views of the military professionals were neglected at the onset of the war were now to dismiss the views of the military as irrelevant or wrong." (full article at :::link::: ).
If there's one word that can be used to describe this "Administration" , it is hubris.
Sadly, the people responsible for this debacle have been well-rewarded. Wolfowitz is off running the World Bank; Rummy will land a cushy job soon too. The only people suffering are the men and women in uniform, and the people of Iraq.